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Due Process and Sanctions Targeted Against Individuals Pursuant to 
U.N. Resolution 1267 (1999). By Johannes Reich
*
 
I. Piercing the Veil of Statehood 
Sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council have served 
as an essential instrument to influence and alter the behavior of national 
leaders in order to maintain international peace and security. Since the first 
mandatory nonmilitary sanctions regime was established in December 1966 
against the white minority government of Southern Rhodesia, the targets of 
these coercive means have traditionally been states or their representatives. In 
contrast, the legal framework established pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) 
and subsequent decisions by the Security Council represents a move to pierce 
the veil of statehood. Under this new regime, individuals not necessarily 
associated with states or state actors are subject to sanctions. This shift in 
focus raises pressing issues of constitutional law, not least because the current 
system lacks basic guarantees of fair trial and effective remedy. Nevertheless, 
this framework built upon the U.N. Charter is, despite its deficiencies, the 
only one capable of coping with challenges such as international terrorism 
which exceed the reach of the nation-state. This Recent Development explores 
the question: what strategy would both strengthen the rule of law within the 
U.N. sanctions regime and preserve the international mechanism addressing 
the most pressing collective challenges to peace? 
II. The Emergence of a Barely Checked Supranational 
Administrative Agency 
The “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security” is vested in the Security Council.
 1
 That body enjoys wide, if not 
unlimited, discretion to determine whether a certain event amounts to a “threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”
2
 Such a determination 
allows the Security Council to “make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.”
3
 The Security Council is specifically entitled to “decide what 
measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed.”
4
 
However, all such decisions made under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter 
“shall be carried out by the Members of the U.N. directly and through their 
action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.”
5
 
Consequently, the resolutions of the Security Council, including sanctions, are 
not self-executing. They require a national enforcement mechanism. In the 
United States, U.N. sanctions are usually enforced through Executive Orders. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
*
 
I would like to thank Professor W. Michael Reisman, Michael Thad Allen, and Jedidiah J. 
Kroncke for their criticisms and comments on earlier versions of this piece as well as the responsible 
editors, Peter Harrell, Jonathan Finer, and Vivek Krishnamurthy, for their most valuable support and 
suggestions. 
1.  U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1. 
2. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
3.  Id. 
4.  U.N. Charter art. 41. 
5.  U.N. Charter art. 48, para. 2. 
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On October 15, 1999, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1267 
(1999) acting under Chapter VII.
6
 In order “that the Taliban turn over Usama 
bin Laden” it imposed an air embargo on the Taliban and froze “funds and 
other financial resources” owned or controlled by the Taliban. The scope of 
these sanctions was considerably expanded by Resolution 1333 (2000), 
adopted on December 19, 2000, to include “Usama bin Laden and individuals 
and entities associated with him . . . including those in the Al-Qaida 
organization.”
7
 The Security Council decided that the member states shall 
freeze financial assets of these individuals (asset freeze), prevent them from 
entering or traveling through their territory (travel ban), and impose an arms 
embargo on the designated individuals and entities.
8
 The administration of 
these sanctions was delegated to a special committee of the Security Council 
comprised of representatives of all Security Council members.
9
  
This Committee registers individuals and entities associated with Osama 
bin Laden or the Qaeda organization in “an updated list, based on information 
provided by States and regional organizations.”
10
 This so-called 
“Consolidated List” catalogues the subjects against whom the sanctions to be 
enforced by the member-states apply. Each member of the United Nations is 
entitled to propose individuals or entities to be included on the Consolidated 
List.
11
 The sanctions imposed as a result of the listing constitute a mere 
“preventive measure in combating terrorist activity.”
12
 They “are not reliant 
upon criminal standards set out under national law.”
13
 Consequently, neither a 
criminal charge nor a conviction is a precondition to be proposed or listed.
14
 
The Committee makes its decisions whether or not to include a person or 
entity in the Consolidated List unanimously. Each member-state of the 
Committee therefore has a veto; issues on which the Committee fails to reach 
a consensus are submitted to the Security Council.
15
 
The current framework provides for two different procedures for an 
individual or an entity to seek to be de-listed directly (the so-called “focal 
point process”) and for a state of residence or citizenship to request removal.
16
 
The “focal point process” allows affected individuals or entities to access the 
United Nations directly through its “focal point,” an agency within the U.N. 
Secretariat designed to receive de-listing requests.
17
 The focal point, however, 
                                                                                                                                                                         
6.  S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999). 
7.  S.C. Res. 1333, ¶ 8(c), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000).  
8.  S.C. Res. 1390, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 28, 2002). 
9.  S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 6, ¶ 6; see Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to 
Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities, 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267 (last visited Apr. 26, 2008). 
10.  S.C. Res. 1390, supra note 8, ¶ 2(c) (emphasis added). See also S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 
7, ¶ 8(c). 
11.  S.C. Res. 1735, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1735 (Dec. 22, 2006). 
12.  S.C. Res. 1617, pmbl. & ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005) (emphasis added). 
13.  S.C. Res. 1735, supra note 11, pmbl. (emphasis added). 
14.  Sec. Council Comm. Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267, Guidelines of the 
Committee for the Conduct of its Work, ¶ 6(c) (Feb. 12, 2007), http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/ 
1267/1267_guidelines.pdf [hereinafter Guidelines]. 
15.  Id. ¶ 4(a).  
16.  See S.C. Res. 1730, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1730 (Dec. 19, 2006). 
17.  See id. ¶ 2 & annex.  
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engages neither in factfinding nor in applying laws.
18
 It merely informs the 
government that initially requested the listing and the government of 
citizenship and residence of the individual or entity’s request for de-listing.
19
 
At least one of these states is required to endorse such a request in order for it 
to be placed on the Committee’s agenda.
20
 The request is deemed to be 
rejected if, after a limited period of consultation, none of the members of the 
Committee explicitly ask for the de-listing. Since decisions are made 
unanimously, the petition is also dismissed if one or more of the fifteen 
members opposes the request.
21
 Moreover, the state of residence or citizenship
is entitled to request that a person or entity be removed from the Consolidated 
List.
22
 
This mechanism, which installs the Committee as a supranational 
agency administering sanctions imposed on individuals, is problematic on 
several grounds. The procedure outlined above might be apt to cope with 
measures intended to be “preventive in nature,”
23
 but it fails to provide 
appropriate legal standards for measures which practically amount to criminal 
sanctions. For example, in the case Nada v. SECO, discussed below, the 
Security Council has frozen assets of and imposed a travel ban on an 
individual for more than six years. Moreover, none of the resolutions adopted 
to date provide a clear legal standard as to whether or not an individual or 
entity is entitled to be removed from the Consolidated List. The current 
framework only provides factors which the Committee may or may not take 
into consideration.
24
 Consequently, even a mistake in identity or the death of a 
listed subject would not necessarily result in a de-listing. Moreover, the state 
that initially requests a listing acts as an iudex in causa sua reviewing its own 
decision. Finally, the consensual decisionmaking process is strongly biased 
toward preserving the status quo. The mechanism accepts that a person or 
entity may remain on the Consolidated List for years based on mere hearsay 
or intelligence that the listed person had no opportunity to challenge. 
III. Blacklisted: Nada v. State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
25
A case recently decided by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court highlights 
the legal problems associated with this sanctions regime. Youssef Mustapha 
Nada, an Italian national born in Egypt, has been a resident of Campione 
d’Italia, a small Italian enclave roughly half a square mile in size fully 
surrounded by Swiss territory. Mr. Nada, a member of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, was a cofounder and co-owner of Al Taqwa Management SA 
(later renamed “Nada Management Organization”), a financial network with 
subsidiaries and branches in Europe, the Maghreb, and the Caribbean. In a 
radio address on November 12, 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush referred 
                                                                                                                                                                         
18.  S.C. Res. 1730, supra note 16, annex. 
19.  Id. 
20.  Id. 
21.  Id.  
22.  See Guidelines, supra note 14, ¶ 8(e). 
23.  Id. ¶ 6(c). 
24.  S.C. Res. 1735, supra note 11, ¶ 14 (emphasis added). 
25.  Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Court] Nov. 14, 2007, 133 Entscheidungen des 
Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts [BGE] II 450 (Switz.). 
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to the institution as one “of two terrorist supporting financial networks.”
26
 Mr. 
Nada was thus named a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” by the U.S. 
Treasury.
27
 Consequently, at the request of the United States, on November 9, 
2001, Nada appeared as “QI.E.53.01” on the U.N Security Council’s so-called 
“blacklist,” the Consolidated List of the U.N. Security Council. 
In order to enforce the Security Council’s non-self-executing sanction, 
the Swiss Federal Council (Switzerland’s executive branch) added Mr. Nada’s 
name to the appendix of a decree three weeks later.
28
 As a consequence, Mr. 
Nada was barred from leaving the enclave of Campione d’Italia, and his assets 
were frozen. An investigation launched by the Office of the Attorney General 
of Switzerland was closed after more than three years, finding insufficient 
evidence to bring the case to the Swiss Federal Criminal Court.
29
 Thereafter, 
Mr. Nada filed a petition with the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs 
(SECO), the administrative agency responsible for the domestic enforcement 
of the sanctions, asking that the constraints be lifted. SECO, however, 
dismissed the petition, arguing that Switzerland was bound by the resolutions 
of the Security Council made pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and 
that SECO was not allowed to review such decisions. On administrative 
appeal, the Federal Department of Economic Affairs reached the same 
conclusion. 
The Swiss Federal Supreme Court dismissed Mr. Nada’s petition on 
November 14, 2007, holding that Switzerland was, according to the U.N. 
Charter, obliged to enforce decisions of the Security Council. The Court 
further stated that member-states could only annul resolutions made by the 
Security Council when they would conflict with jus cogens norms. As the 
guarantees invoked by the petitioner would not qualify as such peremptory 
norms of international law, the court refused to indirectly review the Security 
Council’s resolutions by annulling the federal decree. 
Despite their apparent tension with fundamental human rights (such as 
the guarantee of a fair trial) these judicial decisions are far from unique. Nada 
v. SECO might dramatically illustrate the legal concerns associated with the 
current regime as the geographical particularities of the case resulted in a 
situation that “comes close to house arrest.”
30
 However, the Court of the First 
Instance of the European Communities also refused to review indirectly U.N. 
sanctions on similar grounds.
31
 Furthermore, U.S. courts have consistently 
refrained from annulling economic sanctions imposed or enforced by the 
                                                                                                                                                                         
26.  President George W. Bush, Radio Address by the President to the Nation (Nov. 12, 2001), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011110.html. 
27.  OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSET CONTROL, SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATIONALS AND BLOCKED 
PERSONS 204 (Mar. 19, 2008), http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/t11sdn.pdf 
(updated periodically). 
28.  See Verordnung über Massnahmen gegenüber Personen und Organisationen mit 
Verbindungen zu Usama bin Laden, der Gruppierung “Al-Qaïda” oder den Taliban [Taliban Ordinance] 
Oct. 2, 2000, SR 946.203, available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/c946_203.html (Switz.).  
29.  Bundesstrafgericht [Federal Criminal Court], Nov. 30, 2005, BK 2005.14 (Switz.) ¶ A, 
available at http://bstger.weblaw.ch/docs/BK_2005_13.pdf. 
30.  Nada, 133 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts [BGE] II at 467. 
31.  See, e.g., Case T-315/01, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R II-
3649, available at http://curia.europa.eu/ (select “Case Law,” then select “Search form,” then enter “T-
315/01”).  
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federal government.
32
 In light of the apparent deficiencies of the legal 
framework established pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999), this reluctance of 
national courts, however, is unlikely to persist. The looming possibility of a 
clash between national courts and the international regime should encourage 
the member states to press for an overhaul of the current sanctions regime. 
IV. Providing for Fair Trial and Effective Remedy 
An effective response to the challenges posed by international terrorism, 
in particular the attempt to eliminate the financial networks supporting such 
activities, transcends the reach of individual nation-states. This became 
apparent when the Security Council adopted Resolution 1373 on September 
28, 2001, obliging all member-states to criminalize the funding of terrorist 
acts.
33
 This resolution grants the Security Council wide discretion to define 
both the elastic notion of a “threat to peace”
34
 (which trigger measures 
according to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter)
35
 and the member-states’ 
obligation to carry out these decisions.
36
 According to these unambiguous 
texts, member-states are neither entitled to invoke conflicting international 
obligations nor domestic law in a bid to avoid enforcing such resolutions.
37
 
The Security Council is, indeed, bound by “the Purposes and Principles 
of the United Nations.”
38
 In particular it must heed “human rights.”
39
 The fact 
that legal constraints bind the Security Council does not, however, establish 
jurisdiction of international or national authorities to review whether the 
Security Council does, in fact, meet its obligations. As opposed to the court-
centered legal framework of most contemporary nation-states, the U.N. 
Charter established a system built around the Security Council as a political 
body checked through its own decisionmaking mechanism, namely the veto 
power of its permanent members.
40
 Consequently, the International Court of 
Justice has refrained from reviewing the resolutions made by the Security 
Council.
41
 In order to hold the Security Council at bay, legal scholarship has 
elaborated two distinctive concepts. Acts of the Security Council taken clearly 
                                                                                                                                                                         
32.  Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The United States, in NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED 
NATIONS SANCTIONS 618-19 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2004). See also United States v. Dhafir, 461 
F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2006); Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 373 F.3d 152 (D.C. Cir. 
2004). But see Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (finding Council sanctions against 
Rhodesia unenforceable because of a subsequent federal statute). 
33.  S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1733 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
34.  U.N. Charter art. 39. 
35.  See, e.g., S.C. Res. 748, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31, 1992) (stating that Libya’s 
refusal to extradite the subjects suspected of the bombing of PanAm flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland 
years after the attack amounted to a “threat to peace”). 
36.  See U.N. Charter art. 48; see also id. art. 1, para. 1. 
37.  U.N. Charter art. 103; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, opened for 
signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679. 
38.  U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 2. 
39.  U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3; U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 2.  
40.  U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3. See W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the 
United Nations, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 83, 94-96 (1993). 
41.  Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 
I.C.J. 16, 45 (June 21). 
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outside its competence (manifestly ultra vires) are not legally binding.
42
 
Moreover, resolutions violating norms of jus cogens are held to be void.
43
 
Given the Security Council’s wide discretion in determining whether and how 
it should act under Chapter VII, decisions made clearly beyond its competence 
almost never occur. Furthermore, the substance of jus cogens norms—that is, 
a provision “accepted and recognized by the international community of 
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted”
44
—is 
narrow and contrasts with the broad powers of the Security Council. In sum, 
neither of these concepts could effectively check the Security Council. 
Whereas the inherent checks imposed on the Security Council through 
its process of decisionmaking might, in general, have prevented the Council 
from losing sight of the principles and purposes of the U.N. as far as state and 
state elites were concerned, these checks are far less effective in cases 
involving targeted individuals. This lack of effective constraint invites 
national and regional international courts to provide basic guarantees. The 
European Court of Human Rights, in particular, stated in a precedent issued in 
2005 that it would only defer to national acts enforcing the Security Council’s 
resolution as long as the mechanism controlling the observance of 
fundamental rights can be considered “at least equivalent” to that provided by 
the guarantees enshrined in the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
45
 Apart from the fact that such an 
approach is hardly consistent with the “supremacy clause” of the U.N 
Charter,
46
 such a development risks seriously undermining the U.N.’s already 
fragile ability “to take effective collective measures”
47
 in the face of 
challenges which exceed states’ legal and economic resources. Judicial review 
of Security Council resolutions by national courts would open Pandora’s box 
and result in the fragmentation of U.N. resolutions along the borders of 
national and supranational jurisdictions.
48
 Hence, the U.N. itself must provide 
for an independent administrative mechanism to review both the listing and 
de-listing decisions made by the Committee. Only a mechanism at the level of 
the U.N. can, at the same time, preserve the crucial framework of international 
implementation of collective measures and also validate the core principles of 
the rule of law. Such a review mechanism should build upon the principles set 
forth by the Security Council in Resolution 1617, which imposes sanctions as 
                                                                                                                                                                         
42.  See, e.g., Jochen Frowein, The UN Anti-Terrorism Administration and the Rule of Law, in 
COMMON VALUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT 785, 790 
(Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds, 2006). 
43.  See, e.g., Karl Doehring, Unlawful Resolutions of the Security Council and their Legal 
Consequences, MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF U.N. L. 91, 102-09 (1997). 
44.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 37, art. 53. 
45.  Bosphorus Hava Yollarõ Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim  irketi v. Ireland, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 109, 158.  
46.  U.N. Charter art. 103. See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 37, 
art. 30 para. 1. 
47.  U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1 (emphasis added). 
 48.  See Bosphorus, supra note 45, at 158. See also Opinion of Advocate Gen. Poiares Maduro 
¶ 56, Case C 402/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Comm’n (Jan. 16, 2008), available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/ (select “Case Law,” then select “Search form,” then enter “C 402/05 P”) 
(recommending that the court reverse the earlier Kadi opinion and annul the regulation enforcing U.N. 
Security Resolutions). 
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a “preventive measure in combating terrorist activity.”
49
 Consequently, such 
measures would have to be imposed for a limited duration only based upon, 
inter alia, the level of complexity present in a criminal investigation. Such a 
time limit would justify the listing decision being based upon prima facie 
evidence not necessarily meeting the standards of criminal proceedings. The 
time limit could, furthermore, provide incentives to launch formal 
investigations and criminal proceedings in absentia if unavoidable. De-listing 
requests should be addressed to an independent panel within the U.N. 
framework consisting of independent experts. 
The perseverance of the international system comes at the price of delay, 
as adapting international law through the channels of international politics is 
often a painstakingly slow process. In order to adjust the balance between the 
long-held interest of protecting the international legal order for the sake of 
individual liberty, member states should, in the meantime, make use of the 
leeway granted them for humanitarian needs on a case-by-case basis. After all, 
as Max Weber famously stated, “[p]olitics is a strong and slow boring of hard 
boards. It takes both passion and perspective.”
50
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
49.  S.C. Res. 1617, supra note 12, pmbl. 
50.  MAX WEBER, POLITICS AS VOCATION 55 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans., 1965). 
